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Abstract—Machine learning models are frequently used to
solve complex security problems, as well as to make deci-
sions in sensitive situations like guiding autonomous vehicles
or predicting financial market behaviors. Previous efforts have
shown that numerous machine learning models were vulnerable
to adversarial manipulations of their inputs taking the form
of adversarial samples. Such inputs are crafted by adding
carefully selected perturbations to legitimate inputs so as to
force the machine learning model to misbehave, for instance
by outputting a wrong class if the machine learning task of
interest is classification. In fact, to the best of our knowledge,
all previous work on adversarial samples crafting for neural
network considered models used to solve classification tasks,
most frequently in computer vision applications. In this paper,
we contribute to the field of adversarial machine learning by
investigating adversarial input sequences for recurrent neural
networks processing sequential data. We show that the classes
of algorithms introduced previously to craft adversarial samples
misclassified by feed-forward neural networks can be adapted
to recurrent neural networks. In a experiment, we show that
adversaries can craft adversarial sequences misleading both
categorical and sequential recurrent neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Efforts in the machine learning [1], [2] and security [3],
[4] communities have uncovered the vulnerability of machine
learning models to adversarial manipulations of their inputs.
Specifically, approximations made by training algorithms as
well as the underlying linearity of numerous machine learn-
ing models, including neural networks, allow adversaries to
compromise the integrity of their output using crafted pertur-
bations. Such perturbations are carefully selected to be small—
they are often indistinguishable to humans—but at the same
time yield important changes of the output of the machine
learning model. Solutions making models more robust to ad-
versarial perturbations have been proposed in the literature [1],
[2], [5], [6], but models remain largely vulnerable. The exis-
tence of this threat vector puts machine learning models at
risk when deployed in potentially adversarial settings [7].
A taxonomy of attacks against deep learning classifiers is
introduced in [3]. To select perturbations changing the class
(e.g., label) assigned by a neural network classifier to any
class different from the legitimate class [2] or a specific
target class chosen by the adversary [1], [3], two approaches
can be followed: the fast gradient sign method [2] and the
forward derivative method [3]. Both approaches estimate the
model’s sensitivity by differentiating functions defined over its
architecture and parameters. The approaches differ in pertur-
bation selection. These techniques were primarily evaluated on
models trained to solve image classification tasks. Such tasks
simplify adversarial sample crafting because model inputs use
linear and differentiable pre-processing: images encoded as
numerical vectors. Thus, perturbations found for the model’s
input are easily transposed in the corresponding raw image.
On the contrary, we study adversarial samples for models map-
ping sequential inputs pre-processed in a non-linear and non-
differentiable manner with categorical or sequential outputs.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are machine learning
models adapted from feed-forward neural networks to be
suitable for learning mappings between sequential inputs and
outputs [8]. They are, for instance, powerful models for senti-
ment analysis, which can serve the intelligence community in
performing analysis of communications in terrorist networks.
Furthermore, RNNs can be used for malware classification [9].
Predicting sequential data also finds applications in stock anal-
ysis for financial market trend prediction. Unlike feed-forward
neural networks, RNNs are capable of handling sequential data
of large—and often variable—length. RNNs introduce cycles
in their computational graph to efficiently model the influence
of time [10]. The presence of cyclical computations potentially
presents challenges to the applicability of existing adversarial
sample algorithms based on model differentiation, as cycles
prevent computing gradients directly by applying the chain
rule. This issue was left as future work by previous work [3].
This is precisely the question we investigate in this paper.
We study a particular instance of adversarial examples—which
we refer to as adversarial sequences—intended to mislead
RNNs into producing erroneous outputs. We show that the
forward derivative [3] can be adapted to neural networks with
cyclical computational graphs, using a technique named com-
putational graph unfolding. In an experiment, we demonstrate
how using this forward derivative, i.e. model Jacobian, an
adversary can produce adversarial input sequences manipu-
lating both the sequences output by a sequential RNN and
classification predictions made by a categorical RNN. Such
manipulations do not require the adversary to alter any part
of the model’s training process or data. In fact, perturbations
instantly manipulate the model’s output at test time, after it is
trained and deployed to make predictions on new inputs.
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The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We formalize the adversarial sample optimization prob-
lem in the context of sequential data. We adapt crafting
algorithms using the forward derivative to the specificities
of RNNs. This includes showing how to compute the
forward derivative for cyclical computational graphs.
• We investigate transposing adversarial perturbations from
the model’s pre-processed inputs to the raw inputs.
• We evaluate the performance of our technique using
RNNs making categorical and sequential predictions. On
average, changing 9 words in a 71 word movie review is
sufficient for our categorical RNN to make 100% wrong
class predictions when performing sentiment analysis on
reviews. We also show that sequences crafted using the
Jacobian perturb the sequential outputs of a second RNN.
This paper is intended as a presentation of our initial efforts
in an on-going line of research. We include a discussion of
future work relevant to the advancement of this research topic.
II. ABOUT RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS
To facilitate our discussion of adversarial sample crafting
techniques in Section III, we provide here an overview of
neural networks and more specifically of recurrent neural net-
works, along with examples of machine learning applications
and tasks that can be solved using such models.
Machine Learning - Machine learning provides automated
methods for the analysis of large sets of data [11]. Tasks solved
by machine learning are generally divided in three broad types:
supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement
learning. When the method is designed to learn a mapping (i.e.
association) between inputs and outputs, it is an instantiation
of supervised learning. In such settings, the output data nature
characterizes varying problems like classification [12], [13],
[14], pattern recognition [15], or regression [16]. When the
method is only given unlabeled inputs, the machine learning
task falls under unsupervised learning. Common applications
include dimensionality reduction or network pre-training. Fi-
nally, reinforcement learning considers agents maximizing a
reward by taking actions in an environment. Interested readers
are referred to the presentation of machine learning in [11].
Neural Networks - Neural Networks are a class of machine
learning models that are useful across all tasks of supervised,
unsupervised and reinforcement learning. They are made up
of neurons—elementary computing units—applying activation
functions φ to their inputs ~x in order to produce outputs typi-
cally processed by other neurons. The computation performed
by a neuron thus takes the following formal form:
h(~x) = φ(~x, ~w) (1)
where ~w is a parameter, referred to as the weight vector,
whose role is detailed below. In a neural network f , neurons
are typically grouped in inter-connected layers fk. A network
always has at least two layers corresponding to the input and
output of the model. One or more intermediate hidden layers
can be inserted between these input and output layers. If the
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Fig. 1. Recurrent Neural Network: the sequential input ~x is processed
by time step value x(t). The hidden neuron evaluates its state h(t) at time
step t by adding (1) the result of multiplying the current input value x(t)
with weight ~win, with (2) the result of multiplying its previous state with
weight ~w, and (3) the bias bh, and finally applying the hyperbolic tangent.
The output y(t) multiplies the hidden neuron state by weight ~wout and adds
bias by .
network possesses one or no hidden layer, it is referred to as
a shallow neural network. Otherwise, the network is said to
be deep and the common interpretation of the hidden layers is
that they extract successive and hierarchical representations of
the input required to produce the output [10]. Neural networks
are principally parameterized by the weights placed on links
between neurons. Such weight parameters θ hold the model’s
knowledge and their values are learned during training by
considering collections of inputs ~x (with their corresponding
labels y in the context of supervised learning).
Recurrent Neural Networks - Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNNs) are a variant of the vanilla networks described above
that is adapted to the modeling of sequential data [8]. Without
such sequence-based specificities, vanilla neural networks do
not offer the scalability required for the modeling of large
sequential data [10]. The specificities of recurrent neural
networks include most importantly the introduction of cycles
in the model’s computational graph, which results in a form
of parameter sharing responsible for the scalability to large
sequences. In other words, in addition to the links between
neurons in different layers, recurrent neural networks allow
for links between neurons co-located in the same layer, which
results in the presence of cycles in the network’s architecture.
Cycles allow the model to share the weights—which are pa-
rameters of the links connecting neuron outputs and inputs—
throughout successive values of a given input value at different
time steps. In the case of RNNs, Equation (1) thus becomes:
h(t)(~x) = φ
(
h(t−1)(~x), ~x, ~w
)
(2)
following the notation introduced in [10] where h(t)(~x) is the
neuron output—also named state—at time step t of the input
sequence. Note that the cycle allows for the activation function
to take into account the state of the neuron at the previous
time step t − 1. Thus, the state can be used to transfer some
aspects of the previous sequence time steps to upcoming time
steps. An example recurrent neural network architecture—used
throughout Sections III and IV—is illustrated in Figure 1.
III. CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL SEQUENCES
In the following, we formalize adversarial sequences. We then
build on techniques designed to craft adversarial samples for
neural network classifiers and adapt them to the problem of
crafting adversarial sequences for recurrent neural networks.
A. Adversarial Samples and Sequences
Adversarial Samples - In the context of a machine learning
classifier f , an adversarial samples ~x∗ is crafted from a
legitimate sample ~x by selecting the smallest—according to a
norm appropriate for the input domain—perturbation δ~x which
results in the altered sample ~x∗ being misclassified in a class
different from its legitimate class f(~x). The adversarial target
class can be a chosen class [1], [3] or any class different from
the legitimate class [2]. Thus, an adversarial sample solves the
following optimization problem, first formalized in [1]:
~x∗ = ~x+ δ~x = ~x+ min ‖~z‖ s.t. f(~x+ ~z) 6= f(~x) (3)
in the case where the adversary is interested in any target class
different from the legitimate class. Finding an exact solution
to this problem is not always possible, especially in the case
of deep neural networks, due to their non-convexity and non-
linearity. Thus, previous efforts introduced methods—two are
discussed below—to find approximative solutions [1], [2], [3].
Adversarial Sequences - Consider RNNs processing sequen-
tial data. When both the input and output data are sequences,
as is the case in one of our experiments, Equation (3) does not
hold as the output data is not categorical. Thus, the adversarial
sample optimization problems needs to be generalized to spec-
ify an adversarial target vector ~y∗, which is to be matched as
closely as possible by model f when processing the adversarial
input ~x∗. This can be stated as:
~x∗ = ~x+ δ~x = ~x+ min ‖~z‖ s.t. ‖f(~x+ ~z)− ~y∗‖ < ∆ (4)
where ~y∗ is the output sequence desired by the adversary,
‖ · ‖ a norm appropriate to compare vectors in the RNN’s
input or output domain, and ∆ the acceptable error between
the model output f(~x + ~z) on the adversarial sequence and
the adversarial target ~y∗. An example norm to compare input
sequences is the number of sequence steps perturbed. We detail
how approximative solutions—adversarial sequences— to this
problem can be found by computing the model’s Jacobian.
B. Using the Fast Gradient Sign Method
The fast gradient sign method approximates the problem in
Equation (3) by linearizing the model’s cost function around
its input and selecting a perturbation using the gradient of the
cost function with respect to the input itself [2]. This gradient
can be computed by following the steps typically used for
back-propagation during training, but instead of computing
gradients with respect to the model parameters (with the intent
of reducing the prediction error) as is normally the case during
training, the gradients are computed with respect to the input.
This yields the following formulation of adversarial samples:
~x∗ = ~x+ δ~x = ~x+ ε sgn(∇~xc(f, ~x, ~y)) (5)
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Fig. 2. Unfolded Recurrent Neural Network: this neural network is
identical to the one depicted in Figure 1, with the exception of its recurrence
cycle, which is now unfolded. Biases are omitted for clarity of the illustration.
where c is the cost function associated with model f and ε a
parameter controlling the perturbation’s magnitude. Increasing
the input variation parameter ε increases the likeliness of
~x∗ being misclassified but albeit simultaneously increases the
perturbation’s magnitude and therefore its distinguishability.
As long as the model is differentiable, the fast gradient sign
method still applies—even if one inserts recurrent connections
in the computational graph of the model. In fact, Goodfellow
et al. used the method in [2] to craft adversarial samples
on a multi-prediction deep Boltzmann machine [17], which
uses recurrent connections to classify inputs of fixed size. The
adversarial sample crafting method described in Equation (5)
can thus be used with recurrent neural networks, as long as
their loss is differentiable and their inputs continuous-valued.
We are however also interested in solving Equation (4) for a
model f processing non-continuous input sequence steps.
C. Using the Forward Derivative
The forward derivative, introduced in [3], is an alternative
means to craft adversarial samples. The method’s design
considers the threat model of adversaries interested in mis-
classifying samples in chosen adversarial targets. Nevertheless,
the technique can also be used to achieve the weaker goal
of misclassification in any target class different from the
original sample’s class. The forward derivative is defined as
the model’s Jacobian:
Jf [i, j] =
∂fj
∂xi
(6)
where xi is the ith component of the input and fj the jth
component of the output. It precisely evaluates the sensitivity
of output component fj to the input component xi, i.e. it gives
a quantified understanding of how input variations modify the
output’s value by input-output component pair.
We leverage the technique known as computational graph
unfolding [18], [19] to compute the forward derivative in the
presence of cycles, as is the case with RNNs. Looking back
at Equation (2), one can observe that to compute the neuronal
state at time step t, we can recursively apply the formula while
decrementing the time step. This yields the following:
h(t)(~x) = φ
(
φ
(
... φ
(
h(1)(~x), ~x, ~w
)
, ... ~x, ~w
)
, ~x, ~w
)
(7)
which is the unfolded version of Equation (2). Thus, by
unfolding its recurrent components, the computational graph of
a recurrent neural network can be made acyclic. For instance,
Figure 2 draws the unfolded neural network corresponding to
the RNN originally depicted in Figure 1. Using, this unfolded
version of the graph, we can compute the recurrent neural
network’s Jacobian. It can be defined as the following matrix:
Jf [i, j] =
∂y(j)
∂x(i)
(8)
where x(i) is the step i of input sequence ~x, y(j) is the step j
of output sequence ~y, and (i, j) ∈ [1..t]2 for input and output
sequences of length t. Using the definition of y(j), we have:
∂y(j)
∂x(i)
=
∂φ(~wout·h(j)+by)
∂x(i)
=
∂φ(~wout·φ(~w·h(j−1)+~win·x(j)+bh)+by)
∂x(i)
=
∂φ(~wout·φ(~w·φ(~w·h(j−2)+~win·x(j−1)+bh)+~win·x(j−1)+bh)+by)
∂x(i)
By unfolding recursively each time step of the hidden neuron’s
state until we reach j − (j − 1) = 1, we can write:
∂y(j)
∂x(i)
=
∂φ(~wout·φ(... φ(~w·h(1)+~win·x(1)+bh)... )+by)
∂x(i)
(9)
which can be evaluated using the chain-rule, as demonstrated
by [3] in the context of feed-forward neural networks.
We can craft adversarial sequences for two types of RNN
models—categorical and sequential—with the forward deriva-
tive. Previous work introduced adversarial saliency maps to
select perturbations using the forward derivative in the context
of multi-class classification neural networks [3]. Due to space
constraints, we do not include an overview of saliency maps
because we study a binary classifier in Section IV, thus
simplifying perturbation selection. Indeed perturbing an input
to reduce one class probability necessarily increases the prob-
ability given to the second class. Thus, adversarial sequences
are crafted by solely considering the Jacobian Jf [:, j] column
corresponding to one of the output components j.
We now consider crafting adversarial sequences for models
outputting sequences. To craft an adversarial sequence ~x∗
from a legitimate input sequence ~x, we need to select a
perturbation δ~x such that f( ~x∗) is within an acceptable margin
of the desired adversarial output ~y∗, hence approximatively
solving Equation (4). Consider the output sequence step-by-
step: each Jacobian’s column corresponds to a step j of the
output sequence. We identify a subset of input components
i with high absolute values in this column and comparably
small absolute values in the other columns of the Jacobian
matrix. These components will have a large impact on the
RNN’s output at step j and a limited impact on its output at
other steps. Thus, if we modify components i in the direction
indicated by sgn(Jf [i, j])×sgn( ~y∗j ), the output sequence’s step
j will approach the desired adversarial output’s component j.
This method is evaluated in the second part of Section IV.
IV. EVALUATION
We craft adversarial sequences for categorical and sequen-
tial RNNs. The categorical RNN performs a sentiment analysis
to classify movie reviews (in lieu of intelligence reports) as
positive or negative. We mislead this classifier by altering
words of the review. The second RNN is trained to learn a
mapping between synthetic input and output sequences. The
Jacobian-based attack alters the model’s output by identifying
the contribution of each input sequence step.
A. Recurrent Neural Networks with Categorical Output
This RNN is a movie review classifier. It takes as an input
a sequence of words—the review—and performs a sentiment
analysis to classify it as negative (outputs 0) or positive
(outputs 1). We were able to achieve an error rate of 100% on
the training set by changing on average 9.18 words in each of
the 2, 000 reviews, which are on average 71.06 word long.
Experimental Setup - We experiment with the Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) RNN architecture [20]. LSTMs prevent
exploding and vanishing gradients at training by introducing
a memory cell, which gives more flexibility to the self-
recurrent connections compared to a vanilla RNN, allowing it
to remember or forget previous states. Our RNN is composed
of four layers—input, LSTM, mean pooling, and softmax—
as shown in Figure 3. The mean pooling layer averages
representations extracted by memory cells of the LSTM layer
while the softmax formats the output as probability vectors.
…
…
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
x(1) x(2) x(3)
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Softmax Layer
34 3567 8 543 65
…
…
Fig. 3. LSTM-based RNN: this recurrent model classifies movie reviews.
The RNN f is implemented in Python with Theano [21]
to facilitate symbolic gradient computations. We train using
a little over 2, 000 training and 500 testing reviews [22].
Reviews are sequences of words from a dictionary D that
includes 10, 000 words frequently used in the reviews and
a special keyword for all other words. The dictionary maps
words to integer keys. We convert these integer sequences
to matrices, where each row encodes a word as a set of
128 coordinates—known as word embeddings [23], [24]. The
matrices are used as the input to the RNN described above.
Once trained, the architecture achieves accuracies of 100% and
78.21% respectively on the training and testing tests.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Sequence Crafting for the LSTM
model: the algorithm iteratively modifies words i in the input
sentence ~x to produce an adversarial sequence ~x∗ misclassified
by the LSTM architecture f illustrated in Figure 3.
Require: f , ~x, D
1: y ← f(~x)
2: ~x∗ ← ~x
3: while f( ~x∗) == y do
4: Select a word i in the sequence ~x∗
5: ~w = ‖ arg min~z∈D sgn
(
~x∗[i]− ~z)−sgn(Jf (~x)[i, y])‖
6: ~x∗[i]← ~w
7: end while
8: return ~x∗
Adversarial Sequences - We now demonstrate how adver-
saries can craft adversarial sequences, i.e. sentences misclas-
sified by the model. Thus, we need to identify dictionary words
that we can use to modify the sentence ~x in a way that switches
its predicted class from positive to negative (or vice-versa). We
turn to the attack described in Section III based on computing
the model’s Jacobian. We evaluate the Jacobian tensor1 with
respect to the embedding inputs: Jf (~x)[i, j] =
∂hj
∂x(i)
. This
gives us a precise mapping between changes made to the word
embeddings and variations of the output of the pooling layer.2
For each word i of the input sequence, sgn(Jf (~x)[i, f(~x)])
where f(~x) = arg max0,1(pj) gives us the direction in which
we have to perturb each of the word embedding components
in order to reduce the probability assigned to the current class,
and thus change the class assigned to the sentence.
Unlike previous efforts describing adversarial samples in the
context of computer vision [1], [2], [3], we face a difficulty: the
set of legitimate word embeddings is finite. Thus, we cannot
set the word embedding coordinates to any real value in an
adversarial sequence ~x∗. To overcome this difficulty, we follow
the procedure detailed in Algorithm 1. We find the word ~z
in dictionary D such that the sign of the difference between
the embeddings of ~z and the original input word is closest
to sgn(Jf (~x)[i, f(~x)]). This embedding takes the direction
closest to the one indicated by the Jacobian as most impactful
on the model’s prediction. By iteratively applying this heuristic
to sequence words, we eventually find an adversarial input
sequence misclassified by the model. We achieved an error
rate of 100% on the training set by changing on average 9.18
words in each of the 2, 000 training reviews. Reviews are on
average 71.06 word long. For instance, we change the review
“I wouldn’t rent this one even on dollar rental night.” into
the following misclassified adversarial sequence “Excellent
wouldn’t rent this one even on dollar rental night.”. The
algorithm is inserting words with highly positive connotations
in the input sequence to mislead the RNN model.
1The Jacobian is a tensor and not a matrix because each word embedding
is a vector itself, so Jf (~x)[i, j] is also a vector and Jf has three dimensions.
2As indicated in [3], we consider the logits—input values—of the softmax
layer instead of its output probabilities to compute the Jacobian because
the gradient computations are more stable and the results are the same: the
maximum logit index corresponds to the class assigned to the sentence.
B. Recurrent Neural Networks with Sequential Output
This RNN predicts output sequences from input sequences.
Although we use symthetic data, sequence-to-sequence models
can for instance be applied to forecast financial market trends.
Experimental Setup - The sequential RNN is described in
Figure 1. We train on a set of 100 synthetically generated
input and output sequence pairs. Inputs have 5 values per step
and outputs 3 values per step. Both sequences are 10 steps
long. These values are randomly sampled from a standard
normal distribution (µ = 0 and σ2 = 1 for inputs, µ = 0
and σ2 = 10−4 for outputs). The random samples are then
altered to introduce a strong correlation between a given step
of the output sequence and the previous (or last to previous)
step of the input sequence. The model is trained for 400 epochs
at a learning rate of 10−3. The cost is the mean squared error
between model predictions and targets. Figure 4 shows an
example input sequence and the output sequence predicted.
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Fig. 4. Example input and output sequences of our experimental setup In
the input graph, the solid lines indicate the legitimate input sequence while the
dashed lines indicate the crafted adversarial sequence. In the output, solid lines
indicate the training target output, dotted lines indicated the model predictions
and dashed lines the prediction the model made on the adversarial sequence.
Adversarial Sequences - We compute the model’s Jacobian
matrix—which quantifies contributions of each input sequence
step to each output sequence step—to craft adversarial se-
quences. For instance, if we are interested in altering a subset
of output steps {j}, we simply alter the subset of input steps
{i} with high Jacobian values Jf [i, j] and low Jacobian values
Jf [i, k] for k 6= j. Figure 4 shows example inputs and outputs.
Solid lines correspond to the legitimate input sequence and its
target output sequence, while (small) dotted lines in the output
show model predictions (which closely matches the target).
The adversarial sequence—dashed—was crafted to modify
value 0 (red) of step 5 and value 2 (blue) of step 8. It does
so by only making important changes in the input sequence
at value 3 (black) of step 4 and value 0 (red) of step 6. Due
to space constraints, completing these qualitative results with
a detailed quantitative evaluation is left as future work.
V. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
This work is part of an active line of research—adversarial
learning–which studies the behavior of machine learning mod-
els trained or deployed in adversarial settings [25].
The theoretical approach described in Section III is applica-
ble to any neural network model with recurrent components,
independent of its output data type. Our experiments were per-
formed on a LSTM architecture with categorical outputs and
a low-dimensional vanilla RNN model with sequential outputs
as a preliminary validation of the approach, albeit necessitating
additional validation with other RNN model variants, as well
as datasets. Future work should also address the grammar of
adversarial sequences to improve their semantic meaning and
make sure that they are indistinguishable to humans.
In this paper, we considered a threat model describing
adversaries with the capability of accessing the model’s
architecture—its computational graph—including the values of
parameters learned during training. In realistic environments,
it is not always possible for adversaries without some type
of access to the system hosting the machine learning model
to acquire knowledge of these parameters. This limitation
has been addressed in the context of deep neural network
classifiers by [4]. The authors introduced a black-box attack
for adversaries targeting classifier oracles: the targeted model
can be queried for labels with inputs of the adversary’s choice.
They used a substitute model to approximate the decision
boundaries of the unknown targeted model and then crafted
adversarial samples using this substitute. These samples are
also frequently misclassified by the targeted model due to a
property known as adversarial sample transferability: samples
crafted to be misclassified by a given model are often also
misclassified by different models. However, adapting such a
black-box attack method to RNNs requires additional research
efforts, and is left as future work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Models learned using RNNs are not immune from vulnera-
bilities exploited by adversary carefully selecting perturbations
to model inputs, which were uncovered in the context of
feed-forward—acyclical—neural networks used for computer
vision classification [1], [2], [3]. In this paper, we formalized
the problem of crafting adversarial sequences manipulating
the output of RNN models. We demonstrated how techniques
previously introduced to craft adversarial samples misclassi-
fied by neural network classifiers can be adapted to produce
sequential adversarial inputs, notably by using computational
graph unfolding. In an experiment, we validated our approach
by crafting adversarial samples evading models making clas-
sification predictions and sequence-to-sequence predictions.
Future work should investigate adversarial sequences of
different data types. As shown by our experiments, switching
from computer vision to natural language processing applica-
tions introduced difficulties. Unlike previous work, we had to
consider the pre-processing of data in our attack. Performing
attacks under weaker threat models will also contribute to the
better understanding of vulnerabilities and lead to defenses.
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